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The protection oﬀered by IEEE 802.11 security protocols such as WEP, WPA, and WPA2 does not govern wireless control frames.
The control frames are transmitted in clear-text form, and there is no way to verify their validity by the recipients. The flaw of
control frames can be exploited by attackers to carry out DoS attacks and directly disrupt the availability of the wireless networks.
In this work, focusing on resource limitation in the wireless networks, a new lightweight noncryptographic security solution is
proposed to prevent wireless DoS attacks. In order to prove the ability of the proposed model and quantify its performance and
capabilities, a simulation topology is developed, and extensive experiments are carried out. Based on the acquired results, it is
concluded that the model successfully prevents wireless DoS attacks, while the security cost is not remarkable compared to the
model achievements.
1. Introduction
Wireless control frames facilitate and complement deliv-
ery of data frames. These frames include request-to-send
(RTS), clear-to-send (CTS), acknowledgment (ACK), and
contention-free control frames which are CF-End and CF-
End-ACK [1]. The RTS frame is used to address the hidden
node problem in the virtual carrier sensing mechanism. The
CTS frame is transmitted as a respond to the RTS frame. The
ACK frame is used to acknowledge the successful reception
of the data frames. The contention-free control frames are
applied to reset the network allocation vector (NAV) and
subsequently release the channel [1].
The general structure of RTS, CTS/ACK, and CF-End/
CF-End-ACK control frames are presented in Tables 1(a),
1(b), and 1(c), respectively.
As deliberated in the structure of the control frames,
these frames consist of duration field which reserves the
channel for the duration time required to transmit the data
frames. All the wireless stations utilize this duration value to
set the NAV. The maximum NAV value is 32767 µs, and the
wireless stations are not allowed to transmit until the NAV
reaches zero [1].
While the duration field and the NAV mechanism while
are used to minimize the collision probability, they present a
prime opportunity for the attackers to trigger DoS attacks on
the wireless networks. The attacker continuously transmits
forgery control frames with large duration to exhaust the
memory and processing capacity of the wireless network.
Since there is no way for the recipients to verify validity
or duplication of the received control frames, these forgery
frames are accepted by the target wireless network [2, 3].
The DoS attack quickly consumes all available band-
width, resulting in the network no longer being able to
operate in the way it was designed to. These attacks directly
target the network availability and disrupt the normal
communication between the wireless stations. The main
purpose of the attacker is to cause a complete loss of
availability and prevent legitimate use of the resources by the
authorized users [4].
The emerging benefits from the available solutions in
the literature still pose some notable weak points. Most of
these solutions are diverted towards the wireless DoS attacks
using some specific type of control frames while ignoring the
other pertinent factors. There is no evidently consideration
in the solutions to protect contention-free control frames
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Table 1
(a) 802.11 RTS control frame
Frame control Duration Receiver address Sender address FCS
Octets 2 2 6 6 4
(b) 802.11 CTS and ACK control frames
Frame control Duration Receiver address FCS
Octets 2 2 6 4
(c) 802.11 CF-End and CF-End-ACK control frames
Frame control Duration Receiver address BSSID FCS
Octets 2 2 6 6 4
from being exploited by the attackers. In addition, these
solutions are not able to simultaneously ensure low overhead
and less computation power while maintaining strong level
of security. A mechanism to prevent replay attacks is also
further ignored.
On the other hand, utilizing cryptographic-based solu-
tions to protect wireless control frames and prevent DoS
attacks are expensive solutions in terms of excessive overhead
and resource consumption caused by the encryption and
decryption operations. Thus, there is a need to develop a
security mechanism to protect all types of control frames
while supporting the required aspects such as less overhead,
legacy compatibility, replay attack protection, and suﬃcient
level of security.
In this work, we present the ACFNC model as a
lightweight noncryptographic security solution by encom-
passing these required aspects to provide a countermeasure
against DoS attacks based on the control frames in wire-
less networks. In order to implement the ACFNC model
and evaluate its performance and eﬀectiveness, we use
the OMNeT++ simulator. Diﬀerent experiments with the
explicit purposes are conducted to quantify capabilities of the
ACFNC model under diﬀerent network conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the related works with respect to the wireless DoS
attacks. The structure of the proposed ACFNC model is
explained in Section 3. Section 4 describes the simulation
system. In Section 5, the experimental design to conduct the
experiments is described. Results from the implementation
of the model and corresponding analysis are presented in
Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we draw our conclusions.
2. Related Works
In order to mitigate DoS attacks on the wireless net-
works, several schemes have been proposed. These schemes
can be categorized into three general groups which are
cryptographic-based [2, 5, 6], detection [7, 8], and the NAV
validation methods [9–11].
The authors in [2] investigated the control frames
vulnerabilities and adopted enhanced hmac-md5 and hmac-
sha1 (EHMAC) algorithms. The format of RTS, CTS, and
ACK frames was modified by adding extra 80 to 160 bits
to include the output of hmac algorithms. They also added
a 48 bits transmitter address to the CTS and ACK frames.
However, the most important drawback of the model is
the lack of ability to prevent the replay attacks which
keeps the model vulnerable to DoS attacks. In addition, the
overhead of the model is high, while still DoS attacks are
possible against wireless network by exploiting contention-
free control frames.
To address the DoS attacks, the authors in [5] proposed
a packet-by-packet encryption scheme for the RTS and CTS
control frames. The formats of the control frames were mod-
ified by adding extra 160 bits to attach the encrypted fields.
Two new fields as a 32-bit timestamp and a 32-bit sequence
number were considered to avoid replay attack. However,
implementation of the model demands high computation
power for the overall encryption and decryption process.
Besides, the model is unable to prevent the attacks via other
types of control frames.
In [6], a per-packet authentication scheme was proposed
based on a modified pseudorandom function (PRF-16)
authentication mechanism using hmac-sha1 with 16 bits
output results. They utilized a newCRC-16 algorithm instead
of the current CRC-32 algorithm. However, in addition
to modification of the CRC-32 algorithm, the very short
authentication element length is considered as the other issue
of the model. Besides, the model is unable to prevent the
replay attacks, and wireless DoS attacks are still possible
against the wireless networks.
The prevention of wireless DoS attacks based on the
NAV validation methods was initially deliberated by Bellardo
and Savage [9]. In the proposed scheme, a limit was set on
duration value of the control frames. However, the model
does not specify the prevention of contention-free control
frames DoS attacks. The NAV validation methods also have
been discussed in [10, 11]. Furthermore, the DoS detection
schemes have been presented in [7, 8], which limit their scope
to detect the attacks but not preventing them.
3. Proposed ACFNC Model
In order to prevent DoS attacks in wireless networks by
exploiting the control frames vulnerabilities, we propose
a new lightweight authenticator control frame based on
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noncryptographic solutions (ACFNC) model. By consider-
ing the resource limitation in the wireless networks, the
main objectives throughout design of the ACFNC model
are providing suﬃcient level of security and accuracy,
avoiding unnecessary overheads, and preserving high eﬃ-
ciency. Furthermore, the model is legacy compatible and
can be implemented only with firmware upgrades, and thus
eliminating the need for massive replacement of the existing
network hardware. The details of the ACFNC structure are as
follows.
3.1. Define TS Security Field. The ACFNC model defines a
new field as a placeholder to carry out security element. This
field is called TS with 4 bytes in size which is appended at
the end of wireless control frames before the FCS to provide
secure control frames.
3.2. Secure Time Synchronization Function (STSF). In the
wireless communication, time synchronization is an impor-
tant function for time-critical applications, in which the
order or simultaneously launching of the events is necessary.
To achieve this goal, IEEE 802.11 defines a synchronization
function which is called timing synchronization Function
(TSF). The TSF utilizes the beacon frames to present the
new system clock as a timestamp field [12]. At each beacon
interval, which is every 100ms, the TSF presents the current
system clock, while all other stations must set their clock
according to this value.
The ACFNC model is rely on synchronization between
the access point and the wireless stations. Thus, providing
accurate synchronized time is important in the ACFNC
model to perform its respective functions. The TSF spec-
ified by the 802.11 standard, despite its eﬃciency in term
of communication overheads, has been designed without
taking into account security [13]. Consequently, the unpro-
tected beacon frames can be exploited by the attackers to
desynchronize the wireless stations through the following
synchronization attacks [14, 15].
(i) Manipulation attacks: the beacon frames are not
protected [16], thus the attacker can modify their
timestamp field to assign incorrect values.
(ii) Spoofing attacks: the attacker can forge new beacon
frames with wrong timestamp.
(iii) Replay attacks: the attacker may replay a beacon
frame with some delay latter.
All the above attacks on time synchronization have
one main goal, which is to mislead the TSF protocol. The
attackers perform either of these attacks by sending false
beacon frames with wrong clock information to convince
the wireless stations to adjust their clock based on the
erroneous information. Once this happens, the stations will
be out of synchronization with the access point. Losing
the synchronization can cause problems on the ACFNC
model which relies on the accurate synchronized time.
The synchronization attacks may lead to discarding the
frames including control frames. Consequently, the wireless
stations request the retransmission of the missed frames,
resulting in resource exhaustion which aﬀects the bandwidth,
latency, and loss rate. Hence, secure time synchronization
is prerequisite to limit the attacker’s ability and thereby to
guarantee the correct operation of the ACFNC model.
Many mechanisms have been proposed to address time
synchronization issue in the wireless networks [17–19].
However, most of these mechanisms do not take into
account security to address TSF vulnerabilities against the
synchronization attacks. The authors in [20] propose a
secure time synchronization mechanism called TESLA to
authenticate the broadcast beacon frames. However, TESLA
is not suitable for limited recourses wireless networks for
two main reasons [21]. First, TESLA utilizes the digital
signatures which are too expensive to compute in wireless
networks. Second, TESLA has an overhead of about 24 bytes
per each beacon frame which is large overhead for wireless
networks. Thus, TESLA introduces high computation and
communication overheads and cannot directly be applied in
the resource constrained wireless networks.
In order to detect malicious synchronization attacks
using the beacon frames, we use the secure clock synchro-
nization proposed in [22] which is based on µTESLA [21],
a simplified version of TESLA. It is a lightweight broadcast
authentication mechanism based on eﬃcient one-way hash
chains to provide authenticity and integrity for the beacon
frames. The mechanism is suitable for infrastructure wireless
networks and is included in the access point as the base
station [23]. We give a short description of the mechanism,
while more details can be found in [13, 21, 23, 24].
The mechanism uses one-way hash chains which are
much faster than asymmetric algorithms and can be per-
formed in an on-the-fly way such that it causes almost no
additional delay [25]. The secure time synchronization is
calculated by the access point and verified by the wireless
stations as follows.
(A) Access Point Side. The access point chooses random
number kn and generates a sequence of keys (key chain) by
repeatedly applying the one-way hash function H with n bits
length so that ki = H(ki+1) for all n, where n > i ≥ 0 . Due
to one-way nature of hash functions, given ki + 1, everybody
can calculate forward to obtain k0, . . . , ki. However, nobody
by given k0, . . . , ki, can calculate backward to obtain ki+1. The
access point divides the time into intervals and associates
each key from the key chain with one interval. During the ith
interval, the access point calculates the tag over the beacon
frame with ki from the key chain. Then, the beacon frame
with its tag is transmitted to the stations. The access point
discloses the ki after a certain period of time. This means that
each beacon frame discloses the previous key and that the ki
cannot be used to spoof beacon frames after the ith interval
time.
(B) Receiver Side. Upon receiving the beacon frame, the
receiver station first authenticates the disclosed key then the
beacon frame itself. Thus, the receiver first must verify that
the beacon frame has not yet disclosed. If the condition
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Table 2: System parameters and related values.
Parameter Value
Short interframe space (SIFS) 10 µs
Slot time, St 20 µs
Basic bitrate, Br 2Mbps
Physical bitrate, PHYr 1Mbps
Physical header, PHYh 192 bits
Propagation delay time, Pt 1 µs
was not meet, the beacon frame is discarded, otherwise, the
receiver stores it in the buﬀer. Now, the receiver station is
assured that the key is known only by the access point, and
it has not been forged by the attackers. Then, at the time
of the key disclosure when the access point reveals the key,
the receiver uses the disclosed key to authenticate the beacon
frame.
We utilize this mechanism to make a secure TSF (STSF)
for the ACFNCmodel. The SHA1 is used as the one-way hash
function to create the key chain, while the length of each key
in the key chain is considered 64 bits. Adoption of a 64-bit
key extends the time taken to crack to a few thousand years
[26].
3.3. Replay-Preventing Mechanism. Based on the STSF, fur-
ther extensions are done by designing and developing a
replay attack protection mechanism in the ACFNC model
based on the threshold time windows to validate the
freshness of the received control frames. The replay prevent-
ing mechanism is accomplished by tagging each outgoing
control frame with an identifier which is creation time of
that control frame. We formulize five distinct threshold time
windows which are related and mapped to the five control
frames and represent their maximum acceptable age. In
order to determine these five threshold time windows, some
IEEE 802.11 standard notations [1, 27] are used which are
identified in Table 2.
In the IEEE 802.11 standard, except for the unicast data
and management frames that are transmitted in the normal
data rates, the other frames including multicast, broadcast,
and control frames are transmitted in the basic bitrate [28,
29]. Considering this rule, we define TCF as the required time
for the transmission of the entire control frame including its
physical header as follow:
TCF = LCFBr +
PHYh
PHYr
. (1)
In (1), LCF is the length of the secure control
frames after adding the TS security field. The TCF is the
required time considered for all types of control frames as
TRTS, TCTS, TACK, TCF-End, and TCF-End-ACK for transmission
of the secure RTS, CTS, ACK, CF-End, and CF-End-ACK
control frames, respectively. The calculation of these timeout
values by the ACFNC model is accomplished as follows.
(A) Amount of TCTS and TACK. Since the length of the secure
CTS and ACK control frames are the same, the required time
for their transmission also is the same. In order to calculate
the amount of TCTS, and TACK we have
TACK = TCTS = 8× 18 (b)2× 106 (bps) +
192 (b)
106
(
bps
) = 264 us. (2)
(B) Amount of TRTS, TCF-End, and TCF-End-ACK. Since the
length of the secure RTS, CF-End, and CF-End-ACK frames
are the same, the required time for their transmission also is
the same, and we calculate them as follow:
TRTS = TCF-End = TCF-End-ACK = 8× 24 (b)2× 106 (bps)
+
192 (b)
106
(
bps
) = 288 us.
(3)
The basic idea of our proposed replay attack protection
mechanism is to use distinct threshold time windows for each
control frame. Thus, we calculate the maximum amount of
the time window at which the control frame is expected to
be sensed in the wireless channel. This threshold presents a
time window at which a received control frame is valid. Thus,
if the control frame is sensed after this threshold timeout, it
is regarded as an old frame and is discarded by the receiver.
We call the timeout window for the RTS, CTS, ACK, CF-
End, and CF-End-ACK frames as TORTS, TOCTS, TOACK,
TOCF-End, and TOCF−End−ACK, respectively.
It is important to note that determining the value
of each timeout window must be accomplished carefully
with suﬃcient duration to avoid any unexpected network
behavior. Each timeout value must be large enough to avoid
any increase in the number of retransmissions and must
be small enough to avoid unnecessary delays. Assigning the
right value for each timeout has a direct impact on the
wireless network performance so that a wrong value can
significantly degrade the performance due to retransmissions
or collisions.
We formulize and calculate the threshold time windows
related to the secure control frames in the ACFNC model as
follows:
TOACK = TACK + Pt + St + SIFS = 295 us,
TOCTS = TCTS + Pt + St + SIFS = 295 us,
TORTS = TRTS + Pt + St + SIFS = 319 us,
TOCF-End = TCF-End + Pt + St = 309 us,
TOCF-End-ACK = TCF-End-ACK + Pt + St = 309 us.
(4)
Then, we define two new attributes, which are the
following.
(i) Creation time of the control frames: it represents the
time at which the control frame has been created
to be placed into the channel for transmission. The
creation time is tagged into the TS field.
(ii) Current clock time (CCT): it is the current system
time which is assigned by the STSF in the secure
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beacon frames and represents arrival time of the
control frames.
Creation time of each outgoing control frame is tagged
into the TS field, and then the control frame is transmitted
to the destination address. Upon receiving the control frame,
the recipient must verify if its TS value is fresh. In order
to accomplish this verification, the recipient utilizes the
following equation:
0 ≤ CCT− received TS ≤ Δt, (5)
where Δt is corresponding threshold time window.
The two major advantages of the proposed replay attack
protection mechanism are as follows.
(i) Wireless networks are limited in terms of their
resources such as bandwidth, buﬀer, computation
power, and battery lifetime [30]. In this regard, since
the overall process of the protection mechanism is
based on a simple subtraction, the entire process of
the ACFNCmodel is very fast which enable themodel
to be highly eﬃcient for the limited resources wireless
networks. The recipient of the control frame only
needs to do a simple subtraction to verify the validity
of the received control frames using (5).
(ii) By using this mechanism, there is no need to
keep track of the control frames or their reception
sequence. The model is not memory dependent,
which reduces the overall algorithm complexity with-
out demanding extra cache or memory.
The flowchart of the proposed replay attack prevention
mechanism is provided in Figure 1 .
3.4. Procedure of the ACFNC Model. The process of DoS
attacks prevention by the ACFNCmodel consists of twomain
phases which are generation phase and verification phase.
The details are as follows.
(A) Generation Phase. This phase is carried out by the sender
station to generate value of the TS security field. In this phase,
the sender station determines creation time of the outgoing
control frame. Then, this value is tagged into the TS field of
the control frame and the frame is transmitted to the receiver.
(B) Verification Phase. This phase is carried out by the
receiver station to verify the validity of the received control
frames. Upon receiving the control frame, if the frame does
not have the TS field, it is immediately discarded due to
its wrong format. Otherwise, the receiver applies (5) and
subtracts the CCT from the value of the TS field in the
received control frame. This is to check whether the result is
less than or equal to the corresponding timeout value. If the
required condition is met, the receiver considers the control
frame as a fresh frame. Now, if the frame is ACK, CTS, or RTS
frame, it is accepted by the receiver as a valid control frame
and the corresponding function is implemented. In contrast,
if the frame is CF-End or CF-End-ACK, the receiver must
verify duration field of these frames. If the duration field of
these frames is not zero, the frame is discarded as an invalid
frame due to its wrong format. However, zero duration in
the frame results in accepting the frame by the receiver as
a valid control frame. The general process of the ACFNC
model along with its two corresponding phases is presented
in Figure 2.
4. Simulation System Description
Using the OMNeT++ simulator, we develop two simulation
environments which are called A and B. The simulation
environment A is related to the IEEE 802.11 current model
and the simulation environment B is related to the ACFNC
model. The topology of the two environments is identical to
provide fair conditions to compare the results. The size of
the simulation environments is 300 × 300m2 which include
two areas as authorized and attacker area. The details are as
follows.
4.1. Simulation of the IEEE 802.11 Current Model. The
simulation environment A is developed to implement the
IEEE 802.11 current model. It consists of two areas as
authorized and attacker. The authorized area consists of
two wireless stations associated to the access point which
follow the IEEE 802.11 standard MAC layer. The attacker
area belongs to the attacker station who launches diﬀerent
types of wireless DoS attacks against the authorized wireless
network. Figure 3 shows the simulation environment A to
implement the IEEE 802.11 current model.
In order to carry out diﬀerent types of wireless DoS
attacks by the attacker, we need to develop a new network
interface card (NIC) for the attacker station. Therefore, we
created a new wireless host which is named 80211DoS-Host
with the 80211DoS-NIC. This new node is considered as
the attacker and includes a new MAC layer to conduct the
wireless DoS attacks. We have written the new MAC layer in
C++ code and have added it to the OMNeT++ as a simple
module which is called the 80211DoS-MAC. This new MAC
layer is able to generate all types of forgery control frames
with large duration value as 32767 µs to trigger diﬀerent
types of wireless DoS attacks.
4.2. Simulation of the ACFNC Model. In order to imple-
ment the ACFNC model, the simulation environment B
is developed. It consists of two areas as authorized and
attacker. The authorized area consists of two protected
wireless stations associated to the protected access point
which follow the ACFNCmodel. The attacker area belongs to
the attacker to launch diﬀerent types of wireless DoS attacks
and synchronization attack against the ACFNC model in the
protected wireless network. The simulation environment B
to implement the ACFNC model is shown in Figure 4.
Implementation of the ACFNC model comprises two
phases. The first phase is done in the MAC layer to secure the
control frames. The second phase is done in the management
sublayer (mgmt) to secure time synchronization using the
STSF mechanism as follows.
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CF-End CF-End-ACK
CCT-TS ≤ TOCF-End TOCF-End-ACK
ACK
Frame is fresh
T
CCT-TS ≤ TORTSCCT-TS ≤ TOACK
CCT-TS ≤ TOCTS
Has TS
CTS RTS
T
T
T
CCT-TS ≤
T
T
Check TS field
Wrong format,
discard
Frame is old, discard
Figure 1: Replay attack preventing mechanism in the ACFNC model.
Phase 1: Secure MAC Layer. The ACFNC model focuses on
the provisioning the secure control frames at the MAC layer.
Thus, we need to develop a new secure MAC layer and
include the respective ACFNC codes in the both wireless
stations and access point. Therefore, we created a wireless
NIC which is called 80211-ACFNC-NIC. This secure NIC
includes a secure MAC layer which is called 802.11-ACFNC-
MAC layer. The ACFNC code to secure control frames has
been written in C++ and included in the 802.11-ACFNC-
MAC layer.
Phase 2: Secure Time Synchronization (STSF). The synchro-
nization process is a service related to the MAC sublayer
management entity (MLME). The MLME is part of the
MAC layer to monitor the events and create appropriate
MAC management services such as beacon transmission and
synchronization. Thus, in order to implement the STSF,
we created a new management sublayer in the 80211-
ACFNC-NIC for the wireless stations and access point
which are called 80211MgmtSTA-STSF and 80211MgmtAP-
STSF, respectively. The ACFNC source code to secure time
synchronization in the access point and wireless stations is
included in the 80211MgmtAP-STSF and 80211MgmtSTA-
STSF sublayers, respectively.
The structure of the 80211-ACFNC-NIC for the access
point including the secure MAC layer and secure Mgmt
sublayer is presented in Figure 5.
5. Experimental Design
In order to quantify and evaluate the performance of the
ACFNC model, we conduct variety types of experiments.
The methodology to conduct the experiments and obtain the
results is described in the following subsections.
5.1. Characterization of Traﬃc Type. For all the experiments,
we apply both types of data communications as connection-
oriented and connectionless. This enables us to extensively
evaluate the impact of the traﬃc type on the performance of
the ACFNC model in the wireless network. Three types of
traﬃcs are considered, which are the following.
(i) For the connection oriented traﬃc, we apply the FTP
packets. The FTP traﬃcs source is set to a constant
bit rate, while the length of each packet is 1000 B. The
FTP packets are transmitted with interval times of 0.5
seconds.
(ii) For the connectionless traﬃc video packets are
transmitted as a video stream with maximum size of
10000MB. The length of video packets in this stream
is 1000B, which are transmitted at constant bit rate
of 0.5 seconds intervals.
(iii) We use ICMP packets to obtain results from packets
lost due to the attacks and also to obtain the average
of round trip response time. The properties of the
ICMP packets are set as the default in real world with
56 bytes length and interval of every 1 second.
5.2. Performance Measures. The following performance met-
rics are investigated.
(i) End-to-end delay. It is defined as the amount of time
taken by a packet to travel from the originating node
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Verification
phase
Current
control frame TS
Duration = 0
TS is fresh
Accepting valid
TS
Creation time
Secure control frame
T
Discarding old
control frame
T T
Generation
phase
FCS
Transmit “secure control frame” to destination
CF-End/
CF-End-ACK
frames
Discarding
invalid CF-End/
CF-End-ACK
frames
Control frame is CF-
End/CF-End-ACK
Accepting fresh
ACK/CTS/RTS
frames
Figure 2: Algorithm of the ACFNC model.
until it is successfully received at the destination
node.
(ii) Throughput. It is computed by dividing the amount
of data successfully received by destination node with
the time taken to arrive at this node.
(iii) Packet lost ratio (PLR). The PLR is measured as
the number of dropped packets divided by the total
number of sent packets during data transmission.
(iv) Round trip response time (RTT). The RTT is the time
required for a packet to travel from the source to the
destination and back again.
(v) Detection accuracy. Accuracy of the ACFNC model
is investigated in terms of false negative (FN), false
positive (FP), true negative (TN), and true positive
(TP) [31]. The FN is when the received forgery
control fames incorrectly are regarded and accepted
as valid control frames by the recipient. The FP is the
incorrectly discarding of a valid control frame which
is considered as a forgery frame by the recipient. The
TN is the correctly discarding of the forgery control
frames by the receiver. The TP is the correctly accep-
tance of the valid control frames by the recipient.
Access point
Wireless
station1
Wireless
station2
Attacker:
1: DoS attacks
Authorized area
Attacker area
Figure 3: Simulation environment A for the IEEE 802.11 current
model.
Protected access point Attacker:
1: DoS attacks
2: Synchronization
attack
Authorized area
Attacker area
Protected
wireless
station1
Protected
wireless
station2
Figure 4: Simulation environment B for the ACFNC model.
Furthermore, the security cost of the ACFNC model is
taken into account. In order to determine the security cost,
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Modified tcpApp [numTcpApps]
tcp udp
80211 ACFNC NIC
80211 ACFNC MAC 80211 MgmtAP STSF
q: #
q: #
q: #
pingApp
Radio
NotificationBoard Modified udpApp [numudpApps]
InterfaceTable
NetworkLayer
Figure 5: Structure of the protected 80211-ACFNC-NIC in the simulation environment B.
the percentage of performance degradation is calculated as
compared to the current model under normal conditions
without any DoS attacks.
5.3. Attacks Scenarios. The performance of the ACFNC
model is evaluated in terms of its ability to prevent both
wireless DoS attacks and synchronization attacks as the
following scenarios.
5.3.1. DoS Attacks. The details of the strategy to conduct
variety types of wireless DoS attacks against the ACFNC
model is described in the following.
(i) The total simulation time for each experiment is 90
seconds, which is further divided into three parts.
The first 30 seconds is considered a duration at which
the network is under normal conditions with no
attack. The second 30 seconds is the attack duration.
During the entire period, diﬀerent types of DoS
attacks are conducted separately over the ACFNC and
the current model. The third 30 seconds presents
conditions of the wireless network after the attacks.
(ii) For all types of the DoS attacks, the attack cycle
is considered to be 100 forgery control frames per
second (0.01 s attack rate).
(iii) We set duration field of the forgery control frames to
the maximum possible value which is 32767 µs.
(iv) According to the IEEE 802.11, there are two types
of communication modes in wireless networks as
enabled and disabled RTS/CTS handshake [1]. Since
our proposed model directly deals with the wireless
control frames, enabling or disabling of the RTS/CTS
handshake can provide significant diﬀerences in the
network performance in terms of the metrics. There-
fore, all the experiments are performed under the
both communication modes. The disabled RTS/CTS
handshake is denoted as Dis.rtscts, and the enabled
RTS/CTS handshake is denoted as En.rtscts.
(v) The experiments are also implemented in the base-
line mode which evaluates the performance of the
ACFNC model under normal conditions without
the presence of the attackers. The results provide
helpful insight to demonstrate the security cost of the
ACFNC model compared to the current model.
5.3.2. Synchronization Attacks. The synchronization attack
is conducted against the ACFNC model to evaluate its
performance. Like before, the total implementation time is
90 seconds, which is divided in three intervals. The first
30 seconds is considered a duration at which the wireless
network is under normal condition with no attack. At the
second 30 seconds, the attacker launches synchronization
attack against the ACFNCmodel. The forgery beacon frames
with incorrect timestamp values (higher and lower than the
CCT) are broadcasted to the wireless stations to maliciously
desynchronize them. The attack rate is double compared
to the normal beacon interval (100ms) to cause more
instability in the system clock. The results in terms of MAC
loss rate and end-to-end delay are measured under the
both enabled and disabled RTS/CTS handshake to evaluate
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Figure 6: (a) TCP, (b) UDP delay comparison under attacks.
performance of the STSF in the ACFNC model compared
to the TSF. The third 30 seconds presents conditions of the
wireless network after the synchronization attacks.
6. Results and Discussion
In this section, the performance of the ACFNC model is
evaluated and compared with the current model under the
attacks and in the baseline mode as follows.
6.1. Performance Evaluation of the ACFNC Model under DoS
Attacks. The experiments are carried out for the TCP and
UDP traﬃcs separately to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the
ACFNC model to prevent wireless DoS attacks.
6.1.1. TCP/UDP Delay Comparison. The results of the TCP
and UDP delay are presented in Figures 6(a) and 6(b),
respectively.
As represented by the above results, we can confirm the
eﬀectiveness of the ACFNC model to successfully prevent
the wireless DoS attacks. During the attacks in the protected
wireless network using the ACFNC model, normal traﬃcs
(FTP and video packets) are exchanged between the autho-
rized users and the attacks are not able to disrupt the normal
communications.
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In contrast, as the both TCP and UDP results show,
during 30 seconds attacks times (30–60 s), the current model
entirely fails to maintain the regular communication. The
wireless network completely is overwhelmed by the forgery
control frames and the performance practically drops to null.
In the TCP experiment, we observe that when the attacks
start, instantly the connection between the wireless nodes
is broken, and they are unable to transmit or receive any
data. The queued packets before the attacks have to wait
until the attack comes to an end. This is the reason of
high delay for TCP packets in the standard model after the
attacks period. However, the UDP results represent diﬀerent
behavior during the DoS attacks. Unlike the TCP, due to
connectionless nature of the UDP traﬃcs, when the attacks
start the UDP transmission is possible. However, all the
packets go in the queue and are not transmitted to the
destination. The UDP packets enter in the queue until the
queue becomes full, and the rest of the packets are dropped.
Al these UDP packets in the queue must wait there until the
end of the attacks. Therefore, in the standard model, delay
of the UDP packets after the attacks is higher than the TCP
packets.
6.1.2. TCP/UDP Throughput Comparison. The results of the
TCP and UDP throughput are presented in Figures 7(a) and
7(b), respectively.
The above findings and results lead us to conclude that
the ACFNC model, unlike the standard model, is able to
successfully prevent the wireless DoS attacks. In the standard
model before the attack (0–30 s), the amount of throughput
is observed normal. But during the attacks (30–60 s), the
network is flooded with high volume of the forgery control
frames which consumes the available bandwidth so that the
network is not able to handle the valid requests made from
the authorized users. Consequently, the communication
between the users is broken, and the network throughput
quickly drops to null. Comparing the null throughput
of the current model during the attacks with the high
throughput of the proposedmodel further advocates that the
ACFNC model is able to successfully block the attacks and
significantly improve the performance of the IEEE 802.11
wireless networks (100%) under the DoS attacks.
6.1.3. RTT/PLR Comparison. We measure the average round
trip response time of the ACFNC model and compare it with
the current model. The result of this comparison is presented
in Figure 8.
Based on the above results, the RTT of the proposed
model and the current model before the attacks (first
30 seconds) are similar in the achievement. However, when
the standard model goes under the attacks, the network
completely is rendered unusable and the provided resources
are unavailable for the intended users. During the attacks
over the standard model, the RTT is null because there is no
traﬃc. The forgery frames of the attacker make buﬀer of the
access point full of useless frames such that it is no longer
able to respond to the legitimate requests. The packets in the
Table 3: PLR comparison.
Model # Sent # Received # Lost PLR %
Current 90 56 34 36
ACFNC 90 90 0 0
queue must wait there until termination of the attacks, thus
they experience high delay after the attacks (60–90 s).
While the current model absolutely fails to prevent
the wireless DoS attacks, the proposed model successfully
prevents the attacks. Comparing the very high RTT of the
standard model with the normal RTT of the ACFNC model
after the attacks further justifies that the protected wireless
network has not been aﬀected by the DoS attacks.
We also provide comparison over the number of lost
packets between the standard model and the ACFNC model.
The results of this comparison are presented in Table 3.
As the above results indicate, the number of packets
lost due to the attacks in the current model is very high.
From the 90 transmitted ICMP packets, about 34 packets
lost during the attacks which increase the amount of lost
ratio substantially to about 36%. The very high amount
of lost ratio in the current model proves its weakness
and disability to confront the DoS attacks. However, in
the wireless network protected by the ACFNC model, it
is observed that all the 90 transmitted ICMP packets are
successfully received by their destination and number of lost
packets is zero. The null amount of lost ratio in presence of
the ACFNCmodel provides evidence for strong ability of the
model to prevent DoS attacks over the wireless networks.
6.2. Performance Evaluation of the ACFNC in the Baseline
Mode. The previous experiments have been accomplished
in presence of the attacker and forgery control frames. In
this section, we investigate the performance of the ACFNC
model in baseline mode. We study the wireless network
behavior during the time at which there are only legal users
and their legal traﬃcs over the wireless network. Evaluation
of the proposed model in baseline mode determines very
helpful insights to demonstrate lifetime overhead and overall
security cost imposed to the wireless networks using the
ACFNC model under normal conditions. The results are
provided as follows.
6.2.1. TCP/UDP Delay Comparison. The impact of the
ACFNC model on delay of the TCP and UDP packets are
presented in Figures 9(a) and 9(b), respectively.
As the above results show, regardless of the type of
traﬃc or the models, the amount of delay is higher when
the handshake is enabled. The best performance for the
current model and the ACFNC model is achieved when
this handshake is disabled throughout the communications.
The TCP and UDP results show that delay of the ACFNC
model and standard model have the same pattern and level of
variations. This proves that the four bytes overhead imposed
by the TS security field do not have remarkable impact over
the performance of the IEEE 802.11 wireless networks.
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Figure 7: (a) TCP, (b) UDP throughput comparison under attacks.
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Figure 9: (a) TCP, (b) UDP delay comparison in baseline mode.
6.2.2. TCP/UDP Throughput Comparison. The impact of
the ACFNC model on the TCP and UDP throughput are
presented in Figures 10(a) and 10(b), respectively.
As for the throughput, the results complement the delay
results. Based on the findings, it is clear that applying the
ACFNCmodel does not cause substantial security cost to the
wireless networks. The security cost caused by the ACFNC
model due to additional overhead (TS field) compared to the
standard model is about 4% and 6% when the handshake is
disabled and enabled, respectively. The 4% or 6% security
cost prove high eﬃciency and practically of the ACFNC
model when comparing with devastating impact of the DoS
attacks on the wireless networks.
Furthermore, based on the results, we observe that
there is a linear relationship between delay and throughput
regardless of the type of traﬃc. It is observed that they are
negatively correlated so that whenever one of them increases,
the other one decreases.
6.2.3. RTT Comparison. This experiment is carried out to
evaluate impact of the proposed model over the RTT in the
wireless network. The results are presented in Figure 11.
The above results represent almost the same amount
of RTT for the standard model and the ACFNC model.
This proves that by using the ACFNC model in the wireless
networks, the packets do not experience any significant
changes in the response time compared to the standard
model.
6.3. Detection Accuracy. In order to evaluate accuracy of the
ACFNC model, we investigate the probability of the cor-
rect/incorrect detection of the valid/forgery control frames
by the ACFNC model. The results are presented as follows.
6.3.1. False Negative (FN). From implementation of the
ACFNC model, we observed that during the DoS attacks,
only the first forgery control frame is verified as a valid
control frame and accepted by the recipient. Accepting one
forgery control frame out of the 3000 transmitted forgery
control frames provides 0.033% FN rate. In contrast, the
standard model accepts all the 3000 forgery control frames
as valid frames to implement. Thus, comparing very low FN
rate of the ACFNCmodel with 100% FN rate of the standard
model proves strong ability of the ACFNC model to prevent
wireless DoS attacks.
6.3.2. False Positive (FP). During the entire implementation
time, we observed that the ACFNC model like the standard
model does not discard any valid control frames. The 0% FP
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Figure 10: (a) TCP, (b) UDP throughput comparison in baseline mode.
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Figure 11: RTT comparison in baseline mode.
rate proves that the ACFNCmodel correctly follows the IEEE
802.11 standard.
6.3.3. True Negative (TN). Based on results of the ACFNC
implementation, we observed that other than the first forgery
control frame the rest of 2999 forgery control frames are
correctly discarded by the recipient. Thus, discarding forgery
control frames by the ACFNC model provides 99.966% TN
rate. Comparing significantly high TN rate of the ACFNC
model with the 0% TN rate of the standard model proves
that the ACFNCmodel strongly prevents DoS attacks against
the wireless network.
6.3.4. True Positive (TP). During the implementation of the
ACFNCmodel, we observed that like the standard model, the
ACFNC model correctly accepts all the valid control frames
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Table 4: Detection accuracy of the ACFNC model.
Detection ACFNC model Current model
FP 0% 0%
FN 0.033% 100%
TP 100% 100%
TN 99.966% 0%
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Figure 12: Impact of synchronization attack on delay: (a) for the
disabled handshake and (b) for the enabled handshake.
without any mistake. Hence, successful acceptance of the all
valid control frames provides 100% TP rate for the ACFNC
model which is identical to the standard model.
The summary of comparison between the accuracy rate
of the ACFNC model and the standard model is provided in
Table 4.
6.4. Performance Evaluation of the STSF in the ACFNC Model.
In this section, we evaluate performance of the STSF in the
ACFNC model compared to the current TSF. The delay and
MAC loss rate are measured under the normal conditions
and under synchronization attack as follows.
6.4.1. Delay Comparison: STSF versus TSF. The results of
delay under synchronization attack against the ACFNC
model for the disabled and enabled handshake are presented
in Figures 12(a) and 12(b), respectively.
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Figure 13: MAC loss rate comparison: (a) for the disabled
handshake and (b) for the enabled handshake.
As the above results show, the forgery beacon frames
with incorrect timestamps have direct impact on the delay
of the TSF. During the 30 seconds attack time (30–60 s),
the delay is higher in presence of the TSF compared to
the STSF. Comparing the delay of the disabled and enabled
handshake shows interesting results. When the handshake
is disabled, under normal conditions (i.e., before and after
the synchronization attack) the delay is lower than the
enabled handshake. However, during the attack, the results
are opposite so that in the disabled handshake, the delay is
higher than the enabled handshake. The reason is that when
the handshake is enabled, the attack causes to drop mostly
the RTS and CTS frames which lead to their retransmission.
In contrast, when the handshake is disabled, the attack causes
to drop the ACK frames, which consequently lead to retrans-
mission of the data frames that is more time consuming than
the retransmission of the RTS or CTS frames. As a result,
using the TSF, the attacker can intentionally delay the beacon
frames by sending low rate forgery beacon frames.
In contrast, the synchronization attack does not have
any impact over the normal performance of the ACFNC
model. The STSF mechanism preserves the correct and
valid synchronization between the authorized stations in the
wireless network.
6.4.2. MAC Loss Rate Comparison: STSF versus TSF. The
results of theMAC loss rate under the synchronization attack
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against the ACFNC for the disabled and enabled handshake
are presented in Figures 13(a) and 13(b), respectively.
Based on the above results it is observed that during
30 seconds synchronization attack (30–60 s) over the TSF,
the attacker’s forgery beacon frames interrupt the active
connection between the wireless stations. The attacker sends
double forgery beacon frames compared to the normal
beacon frames interval. This leads to more instability in the
current clock and causes significant desynchronization and
dropping the packets.
In contrast, the MAC loss rate is zero in presence of
the STSF regardless of the handshake status which shows
that the ACFNC model is robust against the synchronization
attack. The ACFNC model can detect malicious synchro-
nization attack and prevent the wireless network from being
desynchronized by the forgery beacon frames with erroneous
time values. As a result, the attacker is not able to modify
or destroy the clock information sent by the authorized
access point and the ACFNC model correctly performs its
respective functions.
7. Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a noncryptographic security
model, ACFNC, to prevent the wireless DoS attacks based on
control frames vulnerabilities. The ACFNC model has been
implemented and further evaluated for validation through
a series of extensive experiments to compare with the IEEE
802.11 standard model.
Our findings and results have clearly lead us to the con-
clusion that while the IEEE 802.11 standard model is highly
vulnerable to prevent the DoS attacks, the ACFNCmodel has
been successful in overcoming the drawbacks and strongly
prevents the wireless DoS attacks. Based on the results, we
deduce that the simple structure of the ACFNC model does
not demand remarkable computational resources. The secu-
rity cost of the ACFNC model is negligible and comparable
with the standard model under normal conditions.
The lack of complexity through the simplicity of the
overall computation and implementation process, legacy
compatibility, high accuracy, and small security cost and
communication overhead are the substantial advantages of
the ACFNC model which make it practical and eﬃcient in
the limited resources wireless networks.
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Preliminaryȱcallȱforȱpapers
The 2011 European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCOȬ2011) is the
nineteenth in a series of conferences promoted by the European Association for
Signal Processing (EURASIP, www.eurasip.org). This year edition will take place
in Barcelona, capital city of Catalonia (Spain), and will be jointly organized by the
Centre Tecnològic de Telecomunicacions de Catalunya (CTTC) and the
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC).
EUSIPCOȬ2011 will focus on key aspects of signal processing theory and
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Technical Program CoȬChairsapp ca ons as s e e ow. ccep ance o su m ss ons w e ase on qua y,
relevance and originality. Accepted papers will be published in the EUSIPCO
proceedings and presented during the conference. Paper submissions, proposals
for tutorials and proposals for special sessions are invited in, but not limited to,
the following areas of interest.
Areas of Interest
• Audio and electroȬacoustics.
• Design, implementation, and applications of signal processing systems.
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• Image and multidimensional signal processing.
• Signal detection and estimation.
• Sensor array and multiȬchannel signal processing.
• Sensor fusion in networked systems.
• Signal processing for communications.
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Procedures to submit a paper and proposals for special sessions and tutorials will
be detailed at www.eusipco2011.org. Submitted papers must be cameraȬready, no
more than 5 pages long, and conforming to the standard specified on the
EUSIPCO 2011 web site. First authors who are registered students can participate
in the best student paper competition.
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Electronicȱsubmissionȱofȱfullȱpapers 21ȱFeb 2011
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